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Abstract 
Purpose – This paper investigates whether Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) is less sensitive to 
market downturns than conventional investments; the legal implications for fund managers and trustees; 
and possible legislative reforms to allow conventional funds more scope to invest in SRI.  
Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses the market model to estimate betas over the past 15 years 
for SRI funds and conventional investment funds during economic downturns, as distinct from during more 
‘normal’ (non-recessionary) economic times.   
Findings – The beta risk of SRI, both in Australia and internationally, increases more than that of 
conventional investment during economic downturns.  Traditional fund managers and trustees in Australia 
are therefore likely to breach their fiduciary duties if they go long - or remain long - in SRI funds during 
economic downturns, unless relevant legislation is reformed.  
Research limitations/implications – The methodology assumes that alpha and beta in the market model 
are constant. This is the subject of ongoing research. Second, it categorises the state of the market into 
‘normal’ economic conditions and downturns using dummy variables.  More sophisticated techniques could 
be used in future research.   
Practical implications –The current law would prevent conventional funds from investing in SRI. If SRI is 
viewed as socially desirable, useful legislative reforms could include explicitly overriding the common law 
to allow conventional funds to invest in SRI; introducing a 150% tax deduction or investment allowance for 
SRI; and allowing SRI sub-funds to obtain Deductible Gift Recipient status from the Australian Tax Office 
and other taxation authorities.  
Originality/value – The accurate assessment of risk in SRIs is an area which, despite its serious legal 
implications, is yet to be subjected to rigorous empirical investigation.  
Keywords - SRI, market model, GARCH, trust fund, fiduciary duties, market downturns, Australia.  
Paper type: Research paper 
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Introduction 
 
Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) is the process of selecting or managing 
investments with the aim not of maximizing investor returns for given risk per se, but of 
optimising these parameters subject to social, environmental and ethical constraints (eg. 
Oxford Business Knowledge, 2007, p.5). The aggregate value of SRI internationally has 
grown considerably over the past 30 years, to the extent that SRI is now keenly 
encouraged by the United Nations and other supra-national organisations. Specific share 
indices based on SRI, such as the Dow Jones Sustainable Index (DJSI) and London’s 
FTSE4GOOD index, have developed, along with specialised research organisations such 
as the Sustainable Investment Research Institute (SIRIS). In the United States, SRI assets 
are worth US$2.71 trillion (Social Investment Forum-United States (2007); in Canada, 
they are worth some C$503 billion or US$471 billion (Canadian Social Investment 
Organisation, 2006); the UK market is valued at €781 billion or US$1.17 trillion 
(European Social Investment Forum 2006); and Japan’s SRI markets are worth up to 
¥840 billion or US$7.3 billion (Social Investment Forum-Japan, 2007).  The market in 
Australia is as yet comparatively undeveloped, with total assets invested in SRI are 
valued at A$19.4 million or US$17.3 million (Responsible Investment Association of 
Australasia 2007).   
 
While the sector remained a relatively small part of investors’ portfolios and equity 
markets were generally performing well, industry stakeholders such as investment fund 
trustees, their advisory boards and managers, investors, policy makers, legislators and 
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academicians, could be content to leave a number of potentially problematic issues 
unresolved. These issues include whether SRI performs as well as conventional 
investment during a market downturn; if not, whether conventional investment fund 
trustees and their advisory boards risk breaching their fiduciary duties at a time when 
conventional investment returns slump; and whether the law in this area is in need of 
practical reform. But now that the SRI sector has come of age and in the wake of the 
most catastrophic worldwide market downturn since the Great Depression, industry 
stakeholders can no longer afford to ignore these issues. The need to address them 
provides the motivation for this research. If they are left unresolved, we identify the risks 
for conventional fund trustees and their advisory boards. If industry stakeholders choose 
to address these issues, our paper provides some practical suggestions for their resolution, 
in the section entitled “Practical Implications”.  
 
 Objectives   
 
This paper examines (1) the extent to which the risk-adjusted returns on SRI investments 
are similar to those of conventional investments during economic downturns; (2) whether 
SRI is, as posited by some previous studies, less risky and sensitive to economic 
downturns than conventional investments; and (3) our empirical findings on SRI 
performance in light of the existing law on conventional trustees’ fiduciary duties, to 
ascertain whether the current law requires reform.     
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As discussed in the following section, the existing literature is not clear as to whether SRI 
would perform better than conventional investment during market downturns. The 
contribution of this paper is to provide new evidence as to the investment performance of 
SRI during market downturns. This new evidence has disturbing legal implications for 
conventional fund trustees who seek to invest in SRI during market downturns because it 
shows that, by doing so, they risk breaching their fiduciary duties. These legal 
implications of SRI performance by conventional fund trustees during market downturns 
have not been explored in the literature to date. This paper is an attempt to address this 
important shortcoming in the literature.  
 
This paper may appear to embody two stories in one – however, this is unavoidable in a 
cross-disciplinary paper of this nature, covering as it does both finance and law.  It is in 
the context of cross-disciplinary research – in connecting the seemingly disparate threads 
of specialist learning – that some of the greatest contributions to knowledge have been 
made (Kuhn 1970).  
 
Prior Literature 
 
Most empirical studies around the world have reported that, before the global financial 
crisis (GFC), SRI funds internationally performed as well, in terms of annual risk-
adjusted returns, as conventional (non-SRI) funds. This finding appeared to apply in the 
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United States1; in the United Kingdom2; as between SRI and conventional funds from the 
United States, the UK and Germany3; as between such funds from the UK, Germany, 
Sweden and Netherlands4; and – albeit with some variation, depending on the time period 
studied – in Australia.5 All of this empirical evidence relates to periods before the current 
global financial crisis (GFC).  
 
Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that the period since the GFC has seen 
significantly lower investment returns and higher investment risks. In contrast, other 
studies such as Benson and Humphrey (2007) and Bollen (2007) posit that SRIs should 
be less sensitive to market downturns than conventional investments, because investors in 
SRI are investing not simply for profits, but also for other social or ethical objectives that 
provide them with utility. For this reason, these studies suggest that, even in tight 
economic times – as in the recent global financial crisis – SRI investors tend not to 
abandon their SRI investments (as they well might their conventional investments), 
implying arguably that SRI funds are not so risky as conventional funds. The first two 
objectives of this paper represent our attempt to resolve these apparently inconsistent 
findings in the literature. 
 
From a legal perspective, if the risk-adjusted returns on SRI are similar to conventional 
investments in economic downturns, or if SRI is less risky in economic downturns than 
                                                 
1  Diltz 1995, Guerard 1997, Sauer 1997, Gregory et al 1997,  Bauer et al 2005,  Hamilton et al 1993, 
Statman 2000, Goldreyer et al 1999, Renneboog et al 2007, Schroder, 2007, and Renneboog et al 
2008.  
2  Gregory et al 1997 and Schroder, 2007. 
3  Bauer et al 2005.  
4  Kreander et al 2005.  
5  Bauer et al, 2006.  
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conventional investments, then conventional fund managers and trustees are free to invest 
in SRI – and the question could be asked, at least in Australia, why they do not do so 
more. If, on the other hand, the risk-adjusted returns on SRI are significantly less than 
those on conventional investments in economic downturns, or if SRI is riskier in 
economic downturns than conventional investments, it begs the question of whether 
conventional fund managers and trustees would breach their fiduciary duties by investing 
in SRI.  
 
Methodology and Data  
We conduct our analysis within the context of the well-known market model or Capital 
Asset Pricing Model. The Capital Asset Pricing Model simply states that the systematic 
or diversifiable risk, Beta (β), of a portfolio composed of a subset of the assets of the 
market portfolio is:  
    
 
 m
mi
i R
RR
var
,cov       (1) 
where the covariance  mi RR ,cov  between the return on the industry portfolio i and the 
market portfolio mR   is  inversely related to the variance  mRvar   of the market 
portfolio. Given that the covariance between the market portfolio and itself is simply 
 mRvar , the beta of the market portfolio is by definition equal to one, against which the 
sector portfolio can be compared.  A market portfolio which also has a beta equal to one, 
1 , is considered a neutral investment; an market portfolio with a beta less than one 
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1  is considered a defensive or a relatively safe investment; while one with a beta 
greater than one 1  is considered to be an aggressive or relatively risky investment.   
The market model can be used to estimate the unconditional beta for any asset using the 
following regression equation:  
.,,1, TtRR itmtttit         (2) 
where .itR  is the return series of a composite sector index for sector i; .mtR  is the market 
return index; and it  is the disturbance term of mean zero, which is presumed to be 
serially independent and homoscedastic. The intercept .t and slope t   coefficients are 
presumed to be consistent over time, and it is the slope coefficient t  which provides an 
estimate of the beta or systematic risk for sector i.  
 
In practice, the estimation of equation (1) by ordinary least squares has proven to be 
problematic. Many studies including Brooks et al (1998) have found that beta is often 
time-varying and, while the returns series are usually found to be serially independent, 
the residuals are often found to be heteroscedastic and leptokurtic when compared to a 
normal distribution. Time-varying betas can be estimated using multivariate GARCH 
models, recursive regression or state space models. In the present case, it is not our 
intention to establish the magnitude of beta at every point, but rather to distinguish 
between the average value of beta when the returns are rising or falling. Accordingly, we 
add a dummy variable that represents the state of the market, described later, to the 
market model regression: 
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  .,,1,1 TtIRRR ittmtmtit         (3) 
where   is the estimated coefficient which measures the shifts in the slope of the 
equation associated with negative returns in the previous period. Consequently  is an 
estimate of the systematic risk when returns are positive and the sector index is rising, 
while  )(    is an estimate of the systematic risk when returns are negative and the 
sector index is falling. 
 
The problems associated with heteroscedasticity and leptokurtic residuals are modeled 
using the “generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity” or GARCH model 
introduced by Bollerslev (1986) which we estimate under the assumption that the 
residuals follow a t-distribution, rather than a normal distribution.  The result is that the 
time variation in the variance of the error term in equation (3) is simultaneously estimated 
using the following equation:   
 
                             2 1
2
1
2
  ttt        (4) 
 
 
This insures that the estimated coefficients in equation (3) are efficient and can be 
interpreted in the normal manner while the estimated coefficients in equation (4) have no 
practical implications for our analysis.  
We use weekly closing price of four price indexes obtained from Morningstar which run 
from the 7/1/1994 to 29/5/2009 providing a total 804 observations. The first of these 
indexes, the Dow Jones Total Stock Market Index-World (DJTM World), captures price 
movement in the world’s traditional equity markets, while the second index – the Dow 
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Jones Sustainability Index-World (DJSI World) – is a subset of the first that captures 
price movements in a portfolio comprised of equities in SRI. The third index – the Dow 
Jones Total Stock Market Index-Australia (DJTM Australia) - represents price movement 
in Australian traditional equity market, and the fourth – the Dow Jones Sustainability 
Index-Australia (DJSI Australia) - captures price movements in a portfolio comprised of 
Australian equities involved in SRI businesses. 
 
We transform each of these four indices into continuously compounded returns calculated 
as 


1
ln
t
t
t P
PR   and create two idiosyncratic dummy variables  for DTJM –World 
and DTJM- Australia respectively. Each of these idiosyncratic dummy variables takes the 
value 1 if the relevant return series is less than zero 0tR  indicative of “bad news” and 
economic downturn, or 0 when the returns series is greater than or equal to zero 0tR  
indicative of “good news” or more ‘normal’ economic conditions, in line with previous 
literature (see, for instance, Woodward and Anderson, 2009;  Lunde and Timmerman, 
2004;  Maheu and McCurdy, 2000 among others).   
 
Findings  
 
We examined the performance of SRIs against conventional investments, both in 
Australia and internationally, in terms of total risk-adjusted returns. Table 1, below, 
presents a summary of our findings in terms of relevant statistics. It can be seen from this 
table that SRIs internationally (DJSI World) resulted in higher total risk-adjusted returns 
(5.2% pa on average) than conventional investments (DJTM World) [4.8% pa on 
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average]. With regard to investment just in Australia, however, our results showed that, 
prior to the GFC, SRIs (DJSI Australia) significantly under-performed conventional 
investments (DJTM Australia) in terms of total risk-adjusted returns (an average of 5.8% 
pa, compared with 7.1% pa, respectively). These results suggested that, even before the 
GFC, prudent fund managers would have been well advised to carefully consider 
precisely where in Australia they placed their investors’ SRI funds. Since the GFC, it 
appeared from our preliminary research that, internationally, SRI had significantly under-
performed conventional investment in terms of total risk-adjusted returns (-6.6% pa on 
average, as opposed to -5.7% pa respectively).  
 
 
Table 1 
 
Summary Statistics for Preliminary Analysis – Annualised Total Risk-Adjusted Returns 
 
 DJSI Australia 
DJTM 
Australia DJSI World DJTM World 
Pre-GFC Sub-Period    
Mean 0.204 0.211 0.125 0.115 
Standard Deviation 3.463 2.954 2.363 2.379 
Mean/Standard 
Deviation 0.058 0.071 0.052 0.048 
     
GFC Sub-Period    
Mean -0.291 -0.368 -0.327 -0.302 
Standard Deviation 8.096 6.710 4.946 5.335 
Mean/Standard 
Deviation -0.036 -0.055 -0.066 -0.057 
 
 
 
The results from our market model testing of Equation 6 are presented in Table 2 below, 
which is divided into three panels. Panel A shows the estimated coefficients of the mean 
equation, and the relevant t statistics; Panel B sets out the estimated coefficients of the 
variance equation; and Panel C displays the model validation statistics for the mean 
equation.  
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Table 2 
 
Estimates of Coefficients of Equation 6 
 
   SIW on TMW  SIA on TMA  SIA on SIW  TMA on TMW  SIA on TMW 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
   Coef  T‐Stat  Coef  T‐Stat  Coef  T‐Stat  Coef  T‐Stat  Coef  T‐Stat 
 Panel A  The Mean Equation:         .1 ittmtmtit IRRR     
 
  0.000  1.051  0.000  ‐0.233 0.002  2.221  0.002  3.144  0.002  2.193 
  0.992  87.925  1.102  44.360 0.265  4.676  0.355  9.020  0.263  4.827 
  0.043  2.733  ‐0.069 ‐2.129 0.157  2.301  ‐0.021 ‐0.363  0.164  2.202 
                     
Panel B  The Variance Equation:      2 12 12   ttt   
  0.000  1.784  0.000  1.259  0.000  1.494  0.000  1.215  0.000  1.558 
  0.098  4.141  0.080  4.333  0.070  3.710  0.050  3.440  0.075  3.789 
  0.891  36.74  0.920  56.50  0.921  41.41  0.939  45.26  0.915  38.98 
T‐DIST  9.666  2.709  8.858  3.107  8.802  3.510  9.119  2.938  9.071  3.484 
           
Panel C  Summary Statistics   
R2  0.933     0.581     0.112     0.297     0.100    
DW  2.251     2.245     2.092     2.217     2.108    
Q‐Stat(12)  17.63  (0.12)  15.19  (0.23)  13.30  (0.35)  15.02  (0.24)  14.70  (0.26) 
H‐Stat(12)  9.992  (0.62)  3.986  (0.98)  12.72  (0.39)  18.62  (0.10)  13.48  (0.34) 
The Q‐stat and H‐Stat use the Ljung‐Box test on the residuals and squared residuals up to the twelfth lag: p‐values in ( ). 
 
Note: Practically the same results are obtained when the market model is estimated based on risk premia. 
The alphas are all insignificantly different from zero for both SRI and conventional investments in the 
Australian and international cases at the 95% level. 
 
Turning first to Panel C, the summary statistics, we find that, in each case, the null 
hypothesis – that residuals of the three models are free from autocorrelation in both the 
first and second moments, as indicated by the Q-Stat and H-Stat tests respectively (with 
p-values in brackets) – cannot be rejected. In each case, the Durbin-Watson statistic 
indicates that the residuals are free from auto-correlation at the first lag. The coefficient 
of determination, R2, measures the variability in the dependent variable - the returns on 
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sustainable investments, in all but columns (7) and (8) - that are explained by the 
variability of the independent variable, the returns on the market. In the first case, the 
international equity markets, 93% of the variations in the returns on sustainable 
investment are explained by returns on the market portfolio (TMW). In second case, the 
Australian markets, 58% of this variation is explained by the model; and, in the third 
case, only 11% of the variation in sustainable investment in the Australian market is 
explained by variation in the international markets for sustainable investments. 
 
Panel B contains the estimated coefficients of the variance equations and their respective 
t-statistics. The results here are as one would expect - the intercept terms,  are not 
significantly different from zero while the ARCH,  and GARCH, , terms are 
significant in every case. These two terms sum to approximately one indicating that, 
firstly, volatility shocks are quite persistent; and secondly, the estimate of the number of 
degrees of freedom for the t-distribution used to model the residuals is quite small, 
revealing that in every case this distribution is more appropriate than the normal 
distribution. 
 
Perhaps most importantly, Panel A sets out the estimated coefficients of beta for the 
relevant regressions. The first two columns contain the estimates in relation to the 
international market for SRIs and conventional investments. As can be seen, the estimate 
of beta is highly significant and indistinguishable from 1 – ie. the beta of the whole 
market. The estimated coefficient on the dummy variable indicative of bad news is 
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positive and significantly different from zero, indicating that beta increases in response to 
bad news – that is, to a downturn in the market.   
 
Columns (3) and (4), which focus on the Australian market for SRIs and conventional 
investments, show a somewhat different picture. Again, the beta coefficient is highly 
significant and larger than one in magnitude, indicating that, under normal economic 
conditions, investing in SRIs in Australia is riskier than investing in conventional 
investments. The dummy variable is also significant but has a negative sign, indicating at 
first glance that investing in SRIs in Australia is slightly less risky (though only just) 
during an economic downturn than investing in conventional equities in Australia.  
 
Columns (9) and (10) show the results of regressing Australian SRI returns against 
conventional investment returns internationally.  In column (9), the coefficient for beta is 
significant at 0.263, indicating that, from a world perspective (eg. that of a fund manager 
in New York), Australian SRIs are relatively low risk, compared with conventional 
investments internationally. The dummy variable in column (9) is, at 0.164, marginally 
positive and significant, indicating that when the world experiences an economic 
downturn, the systematic risk of Australian SRIs increases marginally.    
 
This result is consistent with the estimates shown in columns (5) and (6), in which we 
model Australian SRIs in the context of SRIs internationally. This model differs slightly 
from the preceding two in that dummy variables indicative of bad news in the previous 
period have been included for both the international and the Australian SRI markets.  
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This addition was not necessary in respect of the other two models because the markets’ 
two return series are so highly correlated that the second dummy variable series would be 
redundant, indicative as it would be of the same changes in returns. 
 
The estimate of the beta in this context is again small though significant, indicating that 
under ‘normal’ economic conditions, SRIs in Australia are less risky than SRIs 
internationally. In terms of the two dummy variables in this model, the estimated 
coefficient in respect of the dummy variable for an economic downturn in Australia was 
not significant; however, the dummy variable for an economic downturn internationally 
was marginally positive and is statistically significant.  
 
For the sake of completeness, columns (7) and (8) show the results of modeling 
conventional investment in Australia as a subset of conventional investment 
internationally.  The significant beta coefficient shows that conventional investment in 
Australia is less risky on average than conventional investment internationally. Again, 
this models included dummy variables indicative for “bad” news (an economic 
downturn) in both the Australian and international markets.  Here the estimated 
coefficients in the model for conventional investment are insignificantly different from 
zero, indicating that when international stock markets decline, conventional investment 
returns in Australia follow those of international conventional investments downward.   
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Research Limitations 
 
The model that we have estimated in this study is not without limitations. The 
methodology assumes that alpha and beta in the market model are constant. This is the 
subject of ongoing research. Second, it categorises the state of the market into ‘normal’ 
economic conditions and downturns using dummy variables.  More sophisticated 
techniques could be used in future research.   
 
The fact that we have found statistically significant differences in the betas between 
periods of increasing and decreasing returns suggests that the betas are in fact time-
varying to some extent. In the present case, this is not in itself particularly important - 
‘average’ betas (which are in effect what we have estimated here) have been shown to 
vary very little from the averages of time-varying betas estimated using more complex  
methods. (see, for example Brooks et al, 2001).    
 
Consequently, we believe that the simplicity of the model presented here has much to 
recommend it in terms of accessibility. Moreover, given that it is not our intention to 
obtain the best possible estimates of beta or to forecast returns, but to simply establish if 
they are affected by the direction of the market, it is unlikely that a more complex method 
of analysis would produce results that differ in any relevant way from those presented 
here.  
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Nevertheless, it would be possible to investigate the causes of the observed changes in 
beta in these markets using more complex methods.  Recall that beta is defined, as in 
equation (2) as the ratio of the covariance between the industry portfolio and the market 
and the variance of the market.  
 
 m
mi
i R
RR
var
,cov          (7) 
The model used here estimates the differences in the magnitude in this ratio when the 
market is rising and falling. These differences can be caused by changes in the covariance 
between the industry and the market, the variance of the market, or both. These effects 
could be distinguished using a multivariate version of the GARCH model, which allows 
the variance of the two series and the covariance between them to be estimated at every 
point of time. This would then allow the calculation of time-varying betas.  The important 
point is that this more complex model would only serve to explain the source of the 
difference in beta that we have observed, in terms of the impact of good and bad news 
upon the covariances and variances, rather than upon the ratio of the two. While this is 
not without interest, it would add little to the topic at hand and we leave it for future 
research.   
 
Practical Implications  
Our findings have important implications for fund managers.  First, for an Australian 
fund manager whose trust deed or taxation status limits it to investments within Australia, 
SRIs are normally riskier than conventional investments. During an economic downturn 
when conventional equity investment returns decline, SRI returns also decline (though 
interestingly, not by as much –consistent to some extent with Benson and Humphrey 
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2007 and Bollen 2007).  Second, for a fund manager – whether based in Australia or 
overseas – who is able to invest globally, SRIs are normally as risky as conventional 
investments, but become riskier than conventional investments when the world enters an 
economic downturn such as the global financial crisis. Having said this, if the fund 
wishes to remain long in SRIs during an economic downturn, SRIs in Australia are 
generally safer than SRIs in other countries.  
 
Furthermore, these findings have compelling legal implications for conventional fund 
managers and trustees.   On an economic view of trust law, a traditional investment 
trustee has a duty to maximize risk-adjusted returns (Boasson et al 2004, p. 56; and 
Martin 2009, pp. 1, 2 and 18). Moreover, a fund trustee risks breaching its fiduciary 
duties if it sacrifices adequate risk-adjusted returns in the pursuit of non-financial goals 
such as SRI (Ali and Gold 2002, pp. 18, 31).6 Also, there is evidence that many fund 
trustees and managers do fear the risk of lawsuits for breaches of their fiduciary or 
statutory duties if they invest in SRIs (Lane 2006, pp. 33-34), or at the least, believe that 
there is less risk of lawsuits if they invest in conventional (non-SRI) investments (Dobris 
2008, p.761).  Williams and Conley (2005a, p. 546n) even found that 55 percent of the 
largest mutual funds in the United States vote against all social and environmental 
proposals; 15 percent vote against nearly all such proposals; and 30 percent abstain from 
voting.  Nor are the fundamental problems solved by using a combination of traditional 
Master Trusts and SRI sub-trusts since, unless the objects of a traditional Master Trust 
                                                 
6  See also, for example, the principles laid down in Vatcher v Paull [1915] AC 372, 378; Chan v 
Zacharia (1984) 154 CLR 178, 198 per Deane J; Keech v Sandford (1726) Cas. T K 61; and Chief 
Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Buckle and Others (1998) 98 ATC 4097.  
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have been varied in accordance with a power of variation in the trust deed, the Master 
Trust is likely to be infected by the breach of duty. 
 
Much, of course, depends on the objectives set out in the relevant trust deed (Finn 1989).7  
Other things being equal, existing traditional (non-SRI) trusts cannot simply invest in 
SRIs if their deeds do not allow this. If they purport to do so, traditional fund trustees and 
managers do risk breaching their fiduciary or statutory duties not to unconscionably 
exercise a power for a purpose not justified by the trust deed8; or a statute (eg. invest in 
SRIs if the ability to do so is not permitted by the trust deed or legislation).  
 
Such an exercise is likely to constitute a fraud on a power; not acting in the best interests 
of all beneficiaries, and perhaps pursuing its own interests9; not acting in good faith, and 
possibly misusing property held in a fiduciary capacity or engaging in conflicts of duty 
and interest10; and/or failing to treat beneficiaries of different classes fairly – for example, 
by advantaging some beneficiaries or beneficiary classes at the expense of others (Finn 
1977, Ch.10).   
 
Unless the trust deed contains an explicit power of variation (and many older trust deeds 
do not), such investment in SRIs could trigger a resettlement of the trust, with a 
concomitant substantial capital gains tax bill if the trust was settled after September 1985 
(Australian Tax Office 1999). While this would not occur if the trust is a tax-exempt 
                                                 
7  See also Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41, 68 per Gibbs CJ. 
8  Vatcher v Paull [1915] AC 372, 378. 
9  Chan v Zacharia (1984) 154 CLR 178, 198 per Deane J.  
10  Keech v Sandford (1726) Cas. T K 61.  
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charitable purpose trust, most investment trusts in this context are not. It is this 
prospective pecuniary cost which is far more likely to precipitate a lawsuit than any 
umbrage about a breach of fiduciary responsibilities per se.   
 
This situation is likely to continue unless perhaps relevant legislation is reformed to 
enhance the attractiveness of SRI as an investment. Whether this is viewed as desirable 
ultimately depends on the type of society we want – that is, on societal values and the 
political will for legislative reform. Possible reforms could include:  
 
 allowing conventional fund managers and trustees to invest in SRI without 
triggering resettlement of their trusts, together with the resultant massive capital 
gains tax bills this would produce;  
 tax concessions for SRI (eg. a 150% tax deduction or investment allowance for 
SRI; and  
 allowing SRI sub-funds to obtain Deductible Gift Recipient status from the 
Australian Tax Office and other taxation authorities.  
 
A detailed analysis of such proposals must, however, be the subject of future research.  
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